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Paradox of determinism.
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2018-08-02 at 8:07 AM UTCLets assume physical determinism is absolutely true
1. Physical determinism is true
2. All future events are caused or determined by prior events
3. One could predict all future events by knowledge of all prior events.
4. A being K with knowledge of all prior events determining his future actions could predict his own future.
This ability shall be referred to as D. Let us call a predicted future X.
With knowledge of X, K sees he will purchase a lottery ticket with number X(a), but will see on TV that the winning lottery ticket will be Y(a).
K buys the winning ticket Y(a) and induces an alternate future based on his knowledge of X. Let us call these informed alternative futures Y.
For any knowledge of X, one can induce future Y. And if you have knowledge of Y, that becomes X and you can further induce another Y. Repeat ad infinitum. Even if K knows all the information, including their reactions to D, this fact itself becomes a causal factor for another Y.
D produces X. X induces Y and falsifies DX. Any DY can be the DX for a further DY. Therefore any DX or DY is inconceivable.
Therefore D is inconceivable. -
2018-08-02 at 8:15 AM UTC
Originally posted by Captain Lets assume physical determinism is absolutely true
1. Physical determinism is true
2. All future events are caused or determined by prior events
3. One could predict all future events by knowledge of all prior events.
4. A being K with knowledge of all prior events determining his future actions could predict his own future.
This ability shall be referred to as D. Let us call a predicted future X.
With knowledge of X, K sees he will purchase a lottery ticket with number X(a), but will see on TV that the winning lottery ticket will be Y(a).
K buys the winning ticket Y(a) and induces an alternate future based on his knowledge of X. Let us call these informed alternative futures Y.
For any knowledge of X, one can induce future Y. And if you have knowledge of Y, that becomes X and you can further induce another Y. Repeat ad infinitum. Even if K knows all the information, including their reactions to D, this fact itself becomes a causal factor for another Y.
D produces X. X induces Y and falsifies DX. Any DY can be the DX for a further DY. Therefore any DX or DY is inconceivable.
Therefore D is inconceivable.
I think I remember learning this in my philosophy of religion class. Maybe I’m wrong. I just remember the professor using a line to explain some of this and then the bit about informed alternative futures. -
2018-08-02 at 8:19 AM UTCThe idea of physical determinism leads to an absurd or inconceivable conclusion. I consider this a valid defeater for physical determinism.
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2018-08-02 at 8:19 AM UTCIf the outcome is "future Y" but K predicts "future X", then K wasn't taking into account his own actions and the value for D is not what you purport it to be.
K's decision-making processes are as much deterministic as anything external to his being. If he had taken those into account, he would have accurately predicted the future he was to induce. -
2018-08-02 at 8:25 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS If the outcome is "future Y" but K predicts "future X", then K wasn't taking into account his own actions and the value for D is not what you purport it to be.
K's decision-making processes are as much deterministic as anything external to his being. If he had taken those into account, he would have accurately predicted the future he was to induce.
I literally addressed this is the post. In fact it is an integral part of the post. If we are assuming PERFECT information, including for any Y, then that would simply become the X for a further Y.
We are assuming determinism here, so even K is deterministic. DY will now factor into K's future decision, and will defeat itself.
That's the point. -
2018-08-02 at 8:30 AM UTC
Originally posted by Captain I literally addressed this is the post. In fact it is an integral part of the post. If we are assuming PERFECT information, including for any Y, them that would simply become the X for a further Y.
We are assuming determinism here, so even K is deterministic. DY will now factor into K's future decision, and will defeat itself.
That's the point.
Except it won't factor into his future decision, "D" accounts for whatever decision is to be made. K's future decision included. There is no DX or DY. There is just D. Any appearance of variation on D can only be a product of imperfect information, or imperfect ability. -
2018-08-02 at 8:33 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS Except it won't factor into his future decision, "D" accounts for whatever decision is to be made. K's future decision included. There is no DX or DY. There is just D. Any appearance of variation on D can only be a product of imperfect information, or imperfect ability.
HTS-Noob so smart! ^_^
*waves pom poms around*
Go nooby, go nooby, it's your birthday, it's your birthday! -
2018-08-02 at 8:34 AM UTCdue to the uncertainty principle I don't think it'll ever be possible to 'calculate the future'
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2018-08-02 at 8:36 AM UTCYou're essentially saying "what if K doesn't act in the way originally determined by D", but "D" would only be "D" if it predicted the way he was going to act. You're presupposing free-will by saying K could do anything other than buy the ticket predicted by D. This is circular logic to justify the illusion of free will on your part, not a paradox on the part of determinism.
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2018-08-02 at 8:37 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS Except it won't factor into his future decision, "D" accounts for whatever decision is to be made. K's future decision included. There is no DX or DY. There is just D. Any appearance of variation on D can only be a product of imperfect information, or imperfect ability.
the idea is that (essentially) through foreknowledge, K no longer belongs to the deterministic chain and is able to derail it -
2018-08-02 at 8:41 AM UTC
Originally posted by -mal- I think I remember learning this in my philosophy of religion class. Maybe I’m wrong. I just remember the professor using a line to explain some of this and then the bit about informed alternative futures.
Why'd you thank the OP and contribute with this shit, you dumb broad? You don't even understand what's going on, and you contributed NOTHING. "Durrrr I fink I remember from my religion cwass... DURRR"
TL/DR:
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2018-08-02 at 9:03 AM UTC
Originally posted by aldra the idea is that (essentially) through foreknowledge, K no longer belongs to the deterministic chain and is able to derail it
And that idea is great, except it's contradictory to the parameters set in the thought experiment. He can't derail the deterministic chain, and if it appears to him as if he can, then the future he predicted was wrong. The experiment presupposes free-will and/or fails to grasp what actual determinism is. "If K predicts using D that he will buy the losing lottery ticket, and then CHOOSES to buy the winning ticket" is essentially just saying "how can determinism be real lol we can make choices". But those choices are as deterministic as anything else, and if the parameters of the thought-experiment were true K would have accurately predicted that he would have chosen to buy the winning lottery ticket because he already knew what the lottery numbers were going to be. You can't have foreknowledge of your decisions and change your decisions - it's not foreknowledge in that case. K either knows what he's going to do or doesn't. And if he doesn't, he's not K and/or doesn't posses the ability. -
2018-08-02 at 9:12 AM UTCI'm getting panic attack flashbacks.
Does anyone remember the outcome of the last determinism thread? -
2018-08-02 at 9:13 AM UTC
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2018-08-02 at 9:16 AM UTC
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2018-08-02 at 9:18 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS And that idea is great, except it's contradictory to the parameters set in the thought experiment.
That is the pointHe can't derail the deterministic chain, and if it appears to him as if he can, then the future he predicted was wrong.
That is the point.The experiment presupposes free-will and/or fails to grasp what actual determinism is. "If K predicts using D that he will buy the losing lottery ticket, and then CHOOSES to buy the winning ticket" is essentially just saying "how can determinism be real lol we can make choices".
Wrong. I am using this as an illustrative example. Even if he doesnt choose freely (this argument has NOTHING to do with the concept of free will) the outcome remains the same.But those choices are as deterministic as anything else, and if the parameters of the thought-experiment were true K would have accurately predicted that he would have chosen to buy the winning lottery ticket because he already knew what the lottery numbers were going to be.
That is the point.You can't have foreknowledge of your decisions and change your decisions - it's not foreknowledge in that case. K either knows what he's going to do or doesn't. And if he doesn't, he's not K and/or doesn't posses the ability.
That is the point.
We started with by assuming a premise (physical determinism) is true, and reached a self contradictory (logically inconceivable or absurd) conclusion. That is the literal definition of a paradox. You are not attacking my argument whatsoever, but rather seem to have a complete misunderstanding of the purpose of a syllogistic argument. Either the premise is therefore untrue or the conclusion was approached through invalid logic. You have to either concede the premise is untrue or show the invalidity of the intermediate logic. -
2018-08-02 at 9:22 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS Except it won't factor into his future decision, "D" accounts for whatever decision is to be made. K's future decision included. There is no DX or DY. There is just D. Any appearance of variation on D can only be a product of imperfect information, or imperfect ability.
Yes, that is why D is an absurd conclusion and you must either abandon the truth of the premises that form it or disprove the further conclusions that can be derived from D that make D impossible. That is the only way to resolve this. -
2018-08-02 at 9:24 AM UTC
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2018-08-02 at 9:39 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS You're essentially saying "what if K doesn't act in the way originally determined by D", but "D" would only be "D" if it predicted the way he was going to act. You're presupposing free-will by saying K could do anything other than buy the ticket predicted by D. This is circular logic to justify the illusion of free will on your part, not a paradox on the part of determinism.
Free will plays absolutely nowhere into this. -
2018-08-02 at 9:41 AM UTC