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Paradox of determinism.
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2018-08-03 at 7:16 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS The computer crashes because it can't both predict the number on the screen and add 1 to that number before displaying it, because the output is itself + 1. It just keeps adding 1s until the machine breaks. This isn't a problem with determinism, this is a problem with your machine. The result that the computer crashes because of its paradoxical parameters is deterministic. -_-
HTS, if you dont understand how logic works then dont comment, it only makes you sound dumb. -
2018-08-03 at 7:20 AM UTC
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2018-08-03 at 7:25 AM UTCWhich is a program that counts to infinity (deterministic).
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2018-08-03 at 7:37 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS Help me then, Captain. Explain what I got wrong.
Imagine if I gave you some syllogism where we assume A=A, then we take some steps to demonstrate that A=B is a necessary outcome of the assumption, so we must abandon it.
In this case, sayin "that cant be true because A=A" isnt a defense of A=A. In fact it supports the conclusion, which is that A=A is untenable BECAUSE it leads to A=B, so long as the intermediate reasoning is sound.
You are engaging in motivated reasoning because of your commitment to preserving the premise. That isnt a valid objection.'cause it seems like the problem is your output is x = x+1.
That is the point. -
2018-08-03 at 7:42 AM UTC
Originally posted by Captain That is the point.
But there's no paradox there. The machine will count. That is the deterministic outcome of x=x+1. It'll count until it breaks, and never display a number other than 0 because it's too busy adding 1s to its predicitions. It's a problem with your machine, not the concept of determinism itself. The result of running that machine can be predicted. ?_?
None of these scenarios lead to any deterministic paradoxes. If anything, they show the absurdity that arises when you try to change the perfectly predicted outcome ("adding one", "buying a different ticket"). These all could be construed as arguments for determinism. lol -
2018-08-03 at 7:45 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS Which is a program that counts to infinity (deterministic).
It is not, and it is not a program. It is a logical impossibility because if x=x+1 then x-x=1 and therefore 0=1
In a program that counts to infinity, you would make a variable named x redefine itself every loop to the output of the last loop but that isnt really the mathematical x=x+1. -
2018-08-03 at 7:46 AM UTC
Originally posted by Captain It's not an assumption, it is a conceivable action, you have to tell me why it is inconceivable. I already demonstrated how it was conceivable.
I never said anything at all about conceivability. I only said that if we accept the determinism hypothesis then then is it impossible for the situation you're describing to happen. It's immediately obvious that a deterministic universe doesn't allow for "changing the future", you even agree with me on this.
That fact that you can assume something and then conceive of a universe wherein your assumptions don't hold say nothing about the status of your assumption as fact.Let me boil it down even further.
A computer QED is made of 3 components
The LCD, which displays a zero by default
The UNG generates a perfect prediction of what number will be displayed on the LCD after QED runs.
The NMD takes this number, adds +1 and outputs it on a display
This is simply a matter of the UNG's function being antecedent to the NMD's. I dont see any conceivability problem here. If we assume that the NMD's function is possible, then there is a paradox. Thats why we assume the NMD's function is not possible. We can expand this very easily to fit some kind of universal state number or whatever.
Is this trolling?Why is it not possible? What is the conceivability problem here? But you can address the above example if it makes it more clear.
See above. -
2018-08-03 at 7:46 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS But there's no paradox there. The machine will count.
No it will not. More importantly, the UNG will simply be wrong every cycle despite the assumed condition that it will be correct. That is the paradox. The assumed condition cannot be correct under these conditions, even if we assume correctness. This is just by virtue of its antecedence to the rest of the machine. -
2018-08-03 at 7:48 AM UTC
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2018-08-03 at 7:51 AM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny An ad-hoc mathematical argument is not logic.
I feel like he's mathematically disproving free will. lol
Originally posted by HTS None of these scenarios lead to any deterministic paradoxes. If anything, they show the absurdity that arises when you try to change the perfectly predicted outcome ("adding one", "buying a different ticket"). These all could be construed as arguments for determinism. lol
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2018-08-03 at 7:59 AM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny I never said anything at all about conceivability. I only said that if we accept the determinism hypothesis then then is it impossible for the situation you're describing to happen.
Yes, thats how deductive reasoning works. The fact that it is impossible but still very demonstrably logically possible... is the poi t.It's immediately obvious that a deterministic universe doesn't allow for "changing the future", you even agree with me on this.
I agree, thats why it is a contradiction and that premise is untenable.That fact that you can assume something and then conceive of a universe wherein your assumptions don't hold say nothing about the status of your assumption as fact.
If you assume a premise true but that assumption logically leads to an impossibility, that is called a paradox. That is literally the formal definition of a paradox. You have to either discard the premise as true or attack the intermediate logic. This isn't a defence, you are just agreeing with me.Is this trolling?
Is this grandstanding? -
2018-08-03 at 8:01 AM UTC
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2018-08-03 at 8:06 AM UTC
Originally posted by HTS I feel like he's mathematically disproving free will. lol
The argument has nothing to do with free will. And that may very well be, and it isnt a problem to me: if you even read the free will thread at all, you would understand that I am a compatibilist. I.e. I believe in strict determinism, but this does not preclude freedom of will. -
2018-08-03 at 8:24 AM UTC
Originally posted by Captain Yes, thats how deductive reasoning works. The fact that it is impossible but still very demonstrably logically possible… is the poi t.
No, that's not how deductive reasoning works.
It's logically possible for humans to fly unaided. There is no logical issue with that idea. It's simply not the case that we can. This doesn't expose a logical paradox with the notion that humans are able to fly. If we know that we can't fly it's only by inductive means.I agree, thats why it is a contradiction and that premise is untenable.
It's a contradiction between the assumptions "you can observe and change the future" and "the universe is physically deterministic", but is says nothing about the internal logical consistency of either.
Originally posted by Captain If a premise logically leads to 0=1, we reject it. Thats why we dont like division by zero. Unless you want to attack the presuppositional belief that A=A is necessarily true, but I dont think you want to do that.
0 != 1 is not a logical axiom or a consequence of anything we'd typically call a logical axiom, it's a mathematical theorem under some formalisms (but not necessarily all).The following users say it would be alright if the author of this post didn't die in a fire! -
2018-08-03 at 9:16 AM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny No, that's not how deductive reasoning works.
It very much is.It's logically possible for humans to fly unaided. There is no logical issue with that idea.
No it is not and yes there is. But that is a separate issue.It's simply not the case that we can. This doesn't expose a logical paradox with the notion that humans are able to fly.
Good thing this is not an accurate analogy to my syllogism, which has nothing to do with practical possibility.If we know that we can't fly it's only by inductive means.
It lies more in the fact that we inductively define a human, and that definition usually precludes unaided flight. If someone suddenly sprouted wings then we probably wouldnt consider them human. But again, this is a totally separate issue.It's a contradiction between the assumptions "you can observe and change the future" and "the universe is physically deterministic", but is says nothing about the internal logical consistency of either.
I never made that first assumption's second half, nor the opposite. Predetermination is a result of the assumptions that interactions happen in conceivably predictable ways and causality is true + all gurther events are determined by previous causes. Are you proposing some sort of metaphysical force makes the future axiomatically unchangeable? Im not assuming the future is unchangeable or changeable. Either idea is a consequence, not an axiom. Im not trying to establish whether the future is changeable or if we have free will. If all things happen predictably
My reasoning springs entirely from the fact that IF we assume determinism is true AND IF we assume this means we can perfectly predict the future, and IF this can be antecedent to a further (even completely deterministic) action based on this perfect prediction (which has no logocal problem) then the baskc assumption cannot be true.
[Qupte]0 != 1 is not a logical axiom or a consequence of anything we'd typically call a logical axiom, it's a mathematical theorem under some formalisms (but not necessarily all).
Are you attack9ng A=A or not. -
2018-08-03 at 9:24 PM UTC
Originally posted by Captain No it is not and yes there is. But that is a separate issue.
What is the logical paradox that comes out of unaided human flight?
The reason I bring it up is to illustrate the distinction between logical and natural possibility. If a proposition is logically impossible then we can say it can not be true in any logically consistent world. This is generally what people are talking about when they refer to "conceivability". On the other hand naturally impossibility ideas are impossible in particular worlds, in this case scenario you've proposed is naturally impossible in a deterministic universe, but does nothing to establish the logical impossibility of determinism itself. The fact that you can describe a sequence of events which would cause us to reject the idea of determinism in some universe where those events take place says nothing about the fact of the matter in the universe we exist in.I never made that first assumption's second half, nor the opposite. Predetermination is a result of the assumptions that interactions happen in conceivably predictable ways and causality is true + all gurther events are determined by previous causes. Are you proposing some sort of metaphysical force makes the future axiomatically unchangeable? Im not assuming the future is unchangeable or changeable. Either idea is a consequence, not an axiom. Im not trying to establish whether the future is changeable or if we have free will. If all things happen predictably
The notion that the future is immutably fixed is a pretty direct consequence of accepting determinism, which you have in your scenario. Your scenario describes a mutable future (e.g. a future wherein foresight allows one to take a different course of action than led to the perceived future). The consequence of one of your assumptions precludes the natural possibility of the other.My reasoning springs entirely from the fact that IF we assume determinism is true AND IF we assume this means we can perfectly predict the future, and IF this can be antecedent to a further (even completely deterministic) action based on this perfect prediction (which has no logocal problem) then the baskc assumption cannot be true.
The prediction premise implies that what is observed through prediction is an actual, ergo the only predictions which can happen are those which are antecedent to the events being predicted. I see the point you're making, it looks like recursive causality, but it's only a logical impossibility when prediction of the future leads to a causal sequence other than the sequence of events being predicted. If we simply say such predictions are naturally impossible (and this is a consequence of the determinism premise) then there is no logical issue. -
2018-08-03 at 9:31 PM UTCHe gone boo.
ETA: He back boo.
