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We have a moral obligation to stop eating meat

  1. 2018-09-20 at 12:02 AM UTC
    #1841
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny
    That's a reasonable question to ask, but unfortunately it doesn't have a single direct answer. There are a number of moral positions that fall under the heading of "moral realist", and they each have different ideas about ideas about where we get the basic moral propositions that we build moral systems upon. You can read about Kant's categorical imperative for one of the most famous examples of a realist metaethical argument.

    But even if you are wholly unconvinced by the arguments put forward by any moral realist, the point I was trying to make to DietPiano was that ethical claims made by realists, structurally, do not depend on consensus e.g. they are either true or false in fact, regardless of what people think about that matter in the same way the proposition "the earth is round" has a truth value that's not contingent upon people's opinions. And also that collecting empirical evidence is not the only way we go about learning things, and there are things which are widely believed to be true (even by DP) which have no empirical support.

    I don't claim to know everything, and I'd say that I have significantly less confidence in my concrete ethical position that eating meat is morally unacceptable than I do in these structural points about moral propositions in general, and evidence supporting them. I'd prefer to reach a common understanding on these points before venturing into specific moral propositions. There's not much point in trying to make the case that "we ought not to eat meat" is a moral truth if we don't have a shared understanding of what is meant by "moral truth".



    I never said you promised me anything. Where did you get that idea?



    No, you did more than link a national geographic video, you made the claim that plants "feel" in a comparable way to humans. If you don't think this is the case I can link your post where you do it (see how that went? I claimed something (that you made a particular statement about plants) and offered to present evidence in support of that claim).

    If you want to back away from your claim then that's fine. Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds and all of that. But don't keep claiming that the natural of plant experience is well understood by "science" and then refuse to provide any evidence in defense of that claim.

    Sure. How would you convince a moral relativist that your moral conclusions are not relative but are actually "moral truths". How would you define the term "moral truth" and how would you convince a moral relativist to accept and adopt your definition?
  2. 2018-09-20 at 12:02 AM UTC
    #1842
    RisiR † 29 Autism
    Originally posted by DontTellEm I follow ur posts & I edited my last.

    In simple terms, ur stance on Not eating meat.

    Lanny no eat meat because Lanny like animal good.
  3. 2018-09-20 at 12:10 AM UTC
    #1843
    DontTellEm Black Hole
    Oh.
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  4. 2018-09-20 at 12:25 AM UTC
    #1844
    Nil African Astronaut [the overexcited four-footed chanar]
    Originally posted by ohfralala Fuck I hate this fucking thread

    I almost regret bumping it.
  5. 2018-09-20 at 12:28 AM UTC
    #1845
    The Self Taught Man Black Hole
    Oh so this is your fault? Well fuck you too.
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  6. 2018-09-20 at 12:29 AM UTC
    #1846
    mmQ Lisa Turtle
    bump
  7. 2018-09-20 at 12:33 AM UTC
    #1847
    The Self Taught Man Black Hole
    Dicks

    Bag of dicks
  8. 2018-09-20 at 1 AM UTC
    #1848
    Lanny Bird of Courage
    Originally posted by Obbe How would you convince a moral relativist that your moral conclusions are not relative but are actually "moral truths".

    Well the point is not that my moral conclusions are truths. I think they are, but my point is structural: when I say "it's wrong to eat meat" that statement has a truth value in the same way statements like "the earth is flat" has a truth value. You might think that truth value us "false", but to think I'm making a claim about peoples opinions is to mistake what I mean.

    How would you define the term "moral truth"

    A moral truth is a true "ought" statement e.g. "we ought to not eat meat". It's a claim about how the world should be, as distinct from how someone might want the world to be, or how the world is.

    and how would you convince a moral relativist to accept and adopt your definition?

    Well I think you might not take the same position as we typically think of moral relativists as taking. Most of the positions that we'd traditionally call "relativist" would actually agree with the idea of moral truth, they'd just say the truth value of a moral proposition is contingent on (but not synonymous with) the individual or culture or whatever frame of reference is chosen for moral values to be relative to. From what you've said I think your position might be "morals are merely opinions", that is there is no difference between a statement like "I would for animals not to be eaten" and "animals should not be eaten". If this is your idea of ethics then I'd say you should adopt the definition I've offered because yours says nothing more than stating your opinion. Mine allows you to express a category of propositions you wouldn't seem to have a term for otherwise, and it's useful to be able to describe that sort of proposition, even if you think none of those propositions are true, since people refer to them rather often. E.g. in threads about moral obligations.
  9. 2018-09-20 at 2:29 AM UTC
    #1849
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny Well the point is not that my moral conclusions are truths. I think they are, but my point is structural: when I say "it's wrong to eat meat" that statement has a truth value in the same way statements like "the earth is flat" has a truth value. You might think that truth value us "false", but to think I'm making a claim about peoples opinions is to mistake what I mean.

    My point is that I don't think your moral conclusions are truths. I don't believe statements like "it's wrong to eat meat" have a truth value in the same way as statements like "the earth is flat". You believe these statements have a truth value in that same way, and I am asking you how you would convince someone who doesn't believe that.

    Originally posted by Lanny A moral truth is a true "ought" statement e.g. "we ought to not eat meat". It's a claim about how the world should be, as distinct from how someone might want the world to be, or how the world is.

    That doesn't seem to make sense. How can someone claim the world should be a certain way without a person desiring the world to be that way? What is the distinction?

    Also who came up with the idea to call "ought statements" truths? Truth is supposed to be what is, not what someone thinks it should be. What is the difference between an "ought statement" and a persons preference or opinion?

    Originally posted by Lanny Well I think you might not take the same position as we typically think of moral relativists as taking. Most of the positions that we'd traditionally call "relativist" would actually agree with the idea of moral truth, they'd just say the truth value of a moral proposition is contingent on (but not synonymous with) the individual or culture or whatever frame of reference is chosen for moral values to be relative to. From what you've said I think your position might be "morals are merely opinions", that is there is no difference between a statement like "I would for animals not to be eaten" and "animals should not be eaten". If this is your idea of ethics then I'd say you should adopt the definition I've offered because yours says nothing more than stating your opinion. Mine allows you to express a category of propositions you wouldn't seem to have a term for otherwise, and it's useful to be able to describe that sort of proposition, even if you think none of those propositions are true, since people refer to them rather often. E.g. in threads about moral obligations.

    I don't believe discussions about "moral obligations" are anything more than people arguing for their opinions. But I still would like you to explain how you would convince someone who doesn't believe your "moral truths" are anything more than your personal preferences.
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  10. 2018-09-20 at 2:58 AM UTC
    #1850
    The Self Taught Man Black Hole
    Originally posted by Lanny Fine, you can make this objection but your argument has changed from "morality requires everyone to agree on it to be true" to "morality isn't supported by 'concrete, measurable data'" with the tacit premise that a theory needs to be supported supported by 'concrete, measurable data' to be valid or acceptable

    My argument encompasses everyone needing to use the same foundation and rules for morality in order for one to justly force moral pressure on another.

    That is not to say that a moral system's foundation is true or not, just consistent by all who practice morality, since it is possible for people to be morally consistent, yet use different foundational systems. Those different systems are equally valid because morality is based on feelings. You can say it's about law or canon, but it isn't, as feelings must enter the equation when formulating morality, and men cannot feel each other's feelings, so it unreasonable to assume that two men should always reach the same conclusion on something that requires them to ponder their respective feelings during their reasoning processes.

    If canon is accepted as word of God, which you seem to have agreed with earlier, correct me if I am wrong, that is an exception. As I suggested before, morality is about the feelings of human observations. If there are no feelings involved with decsion making, as you could potentially theorize of bacteria or plants (not that I necessary agree with that premise), then there would be no morality extant within such creatures.

    with the tacit premise that a theory needs to be supported supported by 'concrete, measurable data' to be valid or acceptable

    Yes, my arguement also asserts that theories of how people "ought to think" of their fellow man (ehtics, morality, perhaps other fields) are not calculable, quantifiable, or able to be physically sensed by humans. Therefor, it can not be expected that two men should come to the same moral conclusions, as men will have different definitions of what is good and bad, as I mentioned in my last post:

    Does good denote pleasure? Some people may recieve pleasure by punching others in the face. Well-being? What if I consider my well-being to be living in the hospital when I'm not sick becuase I like how it feels? Happy? Perhaps I am happiest killing infidels for Allah. Even if it is some conglomeration of certain states of being, every state can be reached by different means depending on the person.

    MID POSIT EDIT: After a quick google search on morality, I believe what I wrote here was in fact an example of the Arguement from Disagreement, which I have not read yet. This may help us progress, or at least get us into more meaty (no pun intended) debate.

    That's not a mathematical theorem though. That's you finding that a mathematical model of how collecting coconuts works. If I say "I have two coconuts and I take three coconuts then I should have six coconuts because 2*3=6 but I find I have five" I haven't formed an argument against mathematics, empirical counter evidence, I've simply formed a poor model of coconut collection.

    Okay, I agree with you now that mathematical theorems are not empirical. However, unlike morality, math is calcuable and quantifiable, which means it is reasonable to expect two men to always reach the same conclusions. 2+2 is always 4.

    Falsifiability is a cornerstone of the modern scientific method, to some the idea of falsification or verification is fundamental to meaning in general.

    Yes, we are getting closer.

    Feelings about observations, the basis for morality, are not falsifiable, or replicable because I cannot be you and feel as you feel.

    MID POSIT EDIT#2:::
    Perhaps let me take a moment to back it up as well.

    I believe we are running into the Is-Ought problem.

    EDIT #3:

    OH MY GOD WE WASTED SO MUCH TIME FOR NO REASON especially since I typed all this on my phone

    Okaye
    that was stoopti
    Oka

    I see the world "as is", and I don't necessarily think that it "ought to be" anything. I can't PROVE that is ought it not to be something, but you can't prove that it ought to be something either. To do that requires religion or an ideal view of something, which again, everyone has a different perspective of. What is the ideal way to treat animals? As servants? As friends? As food? As gods? As tools?

    There is nothing about "rationality" that requires measurement. How can you "measure" a logical proposition or argument like "p -> q; p; Q.E.D. q"? What units do you measure it in? What tools do you use to measure it? Rationality isn't about measurement at all.

    I don't know what that is. Think of any mathematical equation you want. I measure it with mathematical units, and I compute it with a calculator or my mind, which calculates.

    Yes, rationality itself does not require measurement, but morality is irrational to believe in because it must be germinated though feelings, which are irrational. It requires

    we can use tools like logic and reasoning and argumentation to reach moral conclusions.

    To build up to them yes, but that building is founded on your feelings, which I cannot feel.

    Originally posted by DietPiano My argument encompasses everyone needing to use the same foundation and rules for morality in order for one to justly force moral pressure on another.

    Storytime:

    Morality requires faith in something. Not necessarily God, but some kind of vision. But I can't understand your vision, and you can't understand mine.

    I think Malice was of the opinion that there was nothing he ought to put his faith in, because he saw no reason to have faith. I appear to be going in the direction of no faith as well.

    However, unlike Malice, I see this not pessimistically and reason for one to kill thyself because there is no point (although Malice had many other major problems I'm not mentioning at the moment).

    I see this as an utterly liberating thing, as I can make whatever experiences I want, think whatever I want, and be free of any chain-gang of the mind others would try to force on me.

    If compassion is the root of morality, I believe compassion, again, is an intricately complex form of egoism. I cannot even prove or disprove morality, nor can you.

    All I know is that I do not know.

    I don't think humans can comprehend what THIS is. I think it's beyond our perceptive abilities to understand existence whatsoever.

    But there is stuff and stuffness, and stuffness is more interesting than nothing, if nothing even exists. Again, I don't think we can even understand the concept of nothing.

    But I'll go with it. I am at peace, because this is the way it is.

    Way I see it, you can see yourself as a servant, or a God. How do you know you aren't God? Has a different God told you you aren't God? We might all be Gods. Working for infinite complexity&feelings, as we do cool shit.

    Isn't that neat!?

    Boy that 5 strip really fucked me up, family.
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  11. 2018-09-20 at 3:06 AM UTC
    #1851
    vindicktive vinny Black Hole
    Originally posted by DontTellEm Lanny, are u able to simplify?

    I'm interested in what u have to say but it's hard for me to follow.

    It's cool if someone were to be aware of whom their speaking, & not just speak.

    the best way to defend a shaky belief is by enshrouding it with complex sentence structures and obsfucating it with large, scarry big, long words.
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  12. 2018-09-20 at 3:16 AM UTC
    #1852
    Lanny Bird of Courage
    Originally posted by Obbe My point is that I don't think your moral conclusions are truths.

    That's fine, but do you understand how saying my moral conclusions (like that we shouldn't eat meat, for example) is different from saying:

    I don't believe statements like "it's wrong to eat meat" have a truth value in the same way as statements like "the earth is flat".

    ? Like you can think I'm wrong and believe that eating meat is not wrong, but that's simply asserting that the truth value of the statement "eating meat is wrong" is false.

    Why would you say there's no truth value at all? It seems like a well formed idea, the proposition is either true or it isn't, so why deny that there's a truth value to it?

    That doesn't seem to make sense. How can someone claim the world should be a certain way without a person desiring the world to be that way? What is the distinction?

    They're simply different categories of belief. For example, I might believe that the world ought not to have thieves in it, but I still might steal. I have one belief about how the world should be (free of thievery) and one about how I want it to be (having at least one thief in it, namely me) and while I might be a hypocrite for holding these two beliefs at once they don't seem logically contradictory.

    And simply on a level of possibility, people seem very capable of wanting the world to be a certain way but acting contrary to that. Weakness of will is a very common phenomenon in our society.

    Also who came up with the idea to call "ought statements" truths? Truth is supposed to be what is, not what someone thinks it should be.

    I'm not saying ought statements are always true. Just that they have a truth value: they may be true or they may not be. I agree, truths are supposed to be what is, not what someone things it should be. And that's why ought-statements, which I'm asserting have truth values, are not merely statements of opinion.

    What is the difference between an "ought statement" and a persons preference or opinion?

    The critical difference is that ought statements are not expression of desire, but rather an expression of how the world should be. We may be wrong about how the world should be, and it may be the case that there is no way at all that the world should be, but this would simply mean the truth value of all ought statements is false.

    There's a common explanation that I'm not sure is helpful here or not, but I think is an interesting way of putting it. Consider a statement like "if you want to win the race, you ought to train". This is a pretty straight forward statement and it seems to have a truth value. In the case of trying to win races we really probably ought to train, it's probably true. But if you said "if you want to win the race, you should eat poorly and not sleep", well that'd probably be false. Moral propositions are simply those that are not qualified by "if you want X then you should..." but rather those which hold always, or which hold conditional to all the actual facts about the world. Indeed, a statement like "If you want to win the race, and all the true facts in the world are true, then you should train" actually has the same meaning as "If you want to win the race, you should train". The important point here is that there is no structural difference between the conditional and unconditional forms of ought statements, and few would argue that conditional ought statements lack a truth value, so there's no logical reason to deny extending truth value to unconditional ought statements.

    I don't believe discussions about "moral obligations" are anything more than people arguing for their opinions.

    Do you think discussions bout "the shape of the world" is anything more than people arguing for their opinions? If so, what is present in that sort of argument that's missing in an argument about if we ought to eat meat or not?
  13. 2018-09-20 at 12:42 PM UTC
    #1853
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny That's fine, but do you understand how saying my moral conclusions (like that we shouldn't eat meat, for example) is different from saying:



    ? Like you can think I'm wrong and believe that eating meat is not wrong, but that's simply asserting that the truth value of the statement "eating meat is wrong" is false.

    Why would you say there's no truth value at all? It seems like a well formed idea, the proposition is either true or it isn't, so why deny that there's a truth value to it?

    I don't believe statements like "it's wrong to eat meat" are true or false. Statements about what is right or wrong are just personal preferences. I'm asking you how you would convince a person otherwise.


    Originally posted by Lanny They're simply different categories of belief. For example, I might believe that the world ought not to have thieves in it, but I still might steal. I have one belief about how the world should be (free of thievery) and one about how I want it to be (having at least one thief in it, namely me) and while I might be a hypocrite for holding these two beliefs at once they don't seem logically contradictory.

    And simply on a level of possibility, people seem very capable of wanting the world to be a certain way but acting contrary to that. Weakness of will is a very common phenomenon in our society.

    Ok but saying the world ought to be a certain way still seems like an opinion whether you desire it or not. I don't understand how it could be true or false because it is a statement of fantasy. Saying the world should be a certain way is not like saying it is or is not a certain way and carries no truth value as I see it. I'm asking you how you would convince someone otherwise.

    Originally posted by Lanny I'm not saying ought statements are always true. Just that they have a truth value: they may be true or they may not be.

    I understand you, but I do not agree with you and I'm asking you how you would convince someone otherwise. I don't believe ought statements may be true or false. They are not statements about how the world is or is not. They are statements about how someone fantasized how the world should be, and are therefore statement that are based in fantasy or imagination and not reality - truth has nothing to do with these statements as I see it. Change my mind.

    Originally posted by Lanny I agree, truths are supposed to be what is, not what someone things it should be. And that's why ought-statements, which I'm asserting have truth values, are not merely statements of opinion.

    I'm asking you to not simply assert that but to actually explain why you believe that.

    Originally posted by Lanny The critical difference is that ought statements are not expression of desire, but rather an expression of how the world should be. We may be wrong about how the world should be, and it may be the case that there is no way at all that the world should be, but this would simply mean the truth value of all ought statements is false.

    Right, but I don't agree with your assigning a truth value to ought statements. "The way the world should be" is not a matter of truth because it has nothing to do with how the world is or is not. "The way the world should be" is just someone's fantasy or imagination. Please, explain how would you convince someone otherwise?


    Originally posted by Lanny There's a common explanation that I'm not sure is helpful here or not, but I think is an interesting way of putting it. Consider a statement like "if you want to win the race, you ought to train". This is a pretty straight forward statement and it seems to have a truth value. In the case of trying to win races we really probably ought to train, it's probably true. But if you said "if you want to win the race, you should eat poorly and not sleep", well that'd probably be false. Moral propositions are simply those that are not qualified by "if you want X then you should…" but rather those which hold always, or which hold conditional to all the actual facts about the world. Indeed, a statement like "If you want to win the race, and all the true facts in the world are true, then you should train" actually has the same meaning as "If you want to win the race, you should train". The important point here is that there is no structural difference between the conditional and unconditional forms of ought statements, and few would argue that conditional ought statements lack a truth value, so there's no logical reason to deny extending truth value to unconditional ought statements.

    That's just if-then statements which follow logical conditions. Your ought statement "it's wrong to eat meat" has no conditional logic - you aren't deducing the validity of the statement on the condition of anything at all, you are merely stating that the world should be a certain way (in your opinion) and this has nothing to do with the way the world is or is not. It's just fantasy and should not be referred to as a truth. At least that's how I see It, please convince me otherwise.

    Originally posted by Lanny Do you think discussions bout "the shape of the world" is anything more than people arguing for their opinions? If so, what is present in that sort of argument that's missing in an argument about if we ought to eat meat or not?

    The shape of the world is something that can be demonstrated and proven. The shape of the world is something that either is or is not. "Moral or immoral" is not something that can be demonstrated or proven, it is merely the preference of the person making the statement. I'm asking you how you would convince someone otherwise.
  14. 2018-09-20 at 5:20 PM UTC
    #1854
    Lanny Bird of Courage
    Originally posted by Obbe That's just if-then statements which follow logical conditions.

    Why does that make a difference?

    Why would a statement like "you out to train" go from not having a truth value to having one when you throw in a precondition like "if you want to win the race"?

    If we construct a statement like "if <all the facts about the world> then you ought not to eat meat" does that statement have a truth value? It seems to have the exact same structure as a statement like "if you want to win the race, you ought to train" yet the same meaning as the unqualified "you ought not to eat meat".
  15. 2018-09-20 at 6:17 PM UTC
    #1855
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny Why does that make a difference?

    Why would a statement like "you out to train" go from not having a truth value to having one when you throw in a precondition like "if you want to win the race"?

    If we construct a statement like "if <all the facts about the world> then you ought not to eat meat" does that statement have a truth value? It seems to have the exact same structure as a statement like "if you want to win the race, you ought to train" yet the same meaning as the unqualified "you ought not to eat meat".

    A statement like "you ought to train" has no truth value because it isn't stating anything about what is or is not. It says nothing about the real world. It follows nothing which would validate it as true or false. It is just someone's preference.

    A statement like "you ought to train if you want to become faster" is actually stating something about the real world, something that could be true or false.

    I'm asking you how you would convince someone otherwise. Please use "eating meat is immoral" as an example.
  16. 2018-09-20 at 6:55 PM UTC
    #1856
    Lanny Bird of Courage
    Originally posted by Obbe A statement like "you ought to train" has no truth value because it isn't stating anything about what is or is not. It says nothing about the real world. It follows nothing which would validate it as true or false. It is just someone's preference.

    A statement like "you ought to train if you want to become faster" is actually stating something about the real world, something that could be true or false.

    How do those statements differ? Structurally one has a "If you want to win the race" condition put on it but why is that qualification necessary for the statement to have a truth value? It seems to me like if a statement like "if X then Y" has a truth value then a statement like "Y is the case" should also have a truth value.

    I'm asking you how you would convince someone otherwise. Please use "eating meat is immoral" as an example.

    I have, here:

    Originally posted by Lanny If we construct a statement like "if <all the facts about the world> then you ought not to eat meat" does that statement have a truth value? It seems to have the exact same structure as a statement like "if you want to win the race, you ought to train" yet the same meaning as the unqualified "you ought not to eat meat".

    and I don't think you've really responded to the questions I posed there.

  17. 2018-09-20 at 7:46 PM UTC
    #1857
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny How do those statements differ? Structurally one has a "If you want to win the race" condition put on it but why is that qualification necessary for the statement to have a truth value?

    Explained in the last post. Without the condition the statement has no truth value because it doesn't say anything about how the real world is or is not, it doesn't explain why the statement is being stated. "You ought to train" has no truth value by itself.

    Originally posted by Lanny It seems to me like if a statement like "if X then Y" has a truth value then a statement like "Y is the case" should also have a truth value.

    I'm asking you to explain why you believe that.

    Originally posted by Lanny I have, here:



    and I don't think you've really responded to the questions I posed there.

    Those two statements do not have the same meaning. One is referring to a real world condition (you want to win the race) which makes the statement true or false - the other doesn't refer to anything about how the world is or is not; therefore how could it have a truth value? I'm asking you to explain that.
  18. 2018-09-20 at 7:59 PM UTC
    #1858
    Lanny Bird of Courage
    Originally posted by Obbe Explained in the last post. Without the condition the statement has no truth value because it doesn't say anything about how the real world is or is not

    On the contrary, it says something about how the world ought to be. That's saying something about the world. "The way it ought to be" seems like a perfectly valid property of a thing.

    I'm asking you to explain why you believe that.

    It seems like a structural property of the statement. If you have a proposition about a thing "X" and some logical structure like "If Y then X is true" then it seems like X has a truth value on its own. Indeed, we can reason backwards from that and say "If X is not true, then Y is not true", and this statement is resolved by discovering the actual value of X.

    Those two statements do not have the same meaning. One is referring to a real world condition (you want to win the race) which makes the statement true or false - the other doesn't refer to anything about how the world is or is not; therefore how could it have a truth value? I'm asking you to explain that.

    I'm not saying the statements "If you want to win the race you should train" and "you should train" are the same. I'm saying the statements "If <all the facts about the world> then you should train" seems to have the same meaning as "You should train".

    Do you believe a statement like "If <all the facts about the world> then you should train" has a truth value?

  19. 2018-09-20 at 10:26 PM UTC
    #1859
    Obbe Alan What? [annoy my right-angled speediness]
    Originally posted by Lanny On the contrary, it says something about how the world ought to be. That's saying something about the world. "The way it ought to be" seems like a perfectly valid property of a thing.

    Right it's saying how the world "ought to be" but that's not saying anything about how the world actually is or is not. Which is why I'm asking you to explain why you consider ought statements to be "truths". Truth is how the world is or how it is not. How the world "ought to be" has nothing to do with truth, only fantasy and imagination. I'm asking you to explain why you believe ought statements are "truths" and how you would convince someone to believe you.

    Originally posted by Lanny It seems like a structural property of the statement. If you have a proposition about a thing "X" and some logical structure like "If Y then X is true" then it seems like X has a truth value on its own.

    It doesn't. The structure of your sentence demonstrates this... "If Y then X is true". X depends on Y. If Y is unknown, or isn't even mentioned, X must be unknown. If there is no Y then X has no truth value.

    Originally posted by Lanny Indeed, we can reason backwards from that and say "If X is not true, then Y is not true", and this statement is resolved by discovering the actual value of X.

    You're determing the condition of one by the condition of the other.

    Originally posted by Lanny I'm not saying the statements "If you want to win the race you should train" and "you should train" are the same. I'm saying the statements "If <all the facts about the world> then you should train" seems to have the same meaning as "You should train".

    Do you believe a statement like "If <all the facts about the world> then you should train" has a truth value?

    Yes but I do not beileve that has the same meaning as "you should train".

    I do not believe "you ought not eat meat" is the same as "you ought not eat meat because of <insert reason>".

    I do not believe "ought statements" have a truth value because they are not statements about how the world is or is not, they are statements about how someone thinks the world should be.

    I have been asking you all day to to explain how you would convince someone to believe otherwise, and you are not even trying to do so.
    The following users say it would be alright if the author of this post didn't die in a fire!
  20. 2018-09-20 at 10:28 PM UTC
    #1860
    mmQ Lisa Turtle
    Originally posted by Obbe Right it's saying how the world "ought to be" but that's not saying anything about how the world actually is or is not. Which is why I'm asking you to explain why you consider ought statements to be "truths". Truth is how the world is or how it is not. How the world "ought to be" has nothing to do with truth, only fantasy and imagination. I'm asking you to explain why you believe ought statements are "truths" and how you would convince someone to believe you.



    It doesn't. The structure of your sentence demonstrates this… "If Y then X is true". X depends on Y. If Y is unknown, or isn't even mentioned, X must be unknown. If there is no Y then X has no truth value.



    You're determing the condition of one by the condition of the other.



    Yes but I do not beileve that has the same meaning as "you should train".

    I do not believe "you ought not eat meat" is the same as "you ought not eat meat because of <insert reason>".

    I do not believe "ought statements" have a truth value because they are not statements about how the world is or is not, they are statements about how someone thinks the world should be.

    I have been asking you all to to explain how you would convince someone to believe otherwise, and you are not even trying to do so.

    I'd convince them by brainwashing them into believing that we're morally obligated to not eat meat, and then ask them to explain why they feel that way after my brainwashing is complete.
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