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We have a moral obligation to stop eating meat
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2018-12-28 at 9:42 PM UTC
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2018-12-28 at 11:40 PM UTC
Originally posted by Obbe Nobody decided that electron should have "Y" mass. It either does or it doesn't have "Y" mass.
Exactly, and the same goes for moral facts. Nobody decided what is actually morally right. Moral facts are no more a matter of opinion than the mass of an electron is. We have have unjustified or incorrect opinions about what is or isn't right, just as we might have wrong ideas about the mass of an electron, but relegating moral facts to mere opinion is to misunderstand the meaning of terms like "moral obligation" to moral realists. -
2018-12-29 at 1:27 AM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny Exactly, and the same goes for moral facts. Nobody decided what is actually morally right. Moral facts are no more a matter of opinion than the mass of an electron is. We have have unjustified or incorrect opinions about what is or isn't right, just as we might have wrong ideas about the mass of an electron, but relegating moral facts to mere opinion is to misunderstand the meaning of terms like "moral obligation" to moral realists.
I don't think I do misunderstand you, I just don't agree with your assertion that moral facts exist in the same way that the mass of an electron is the mass of an electron.
Your moral conclusions might be consistent with the moral framework they emerge from but if a person rejects your moral frame work they are going to reject your moral conclusions, and so far I have not seen you give any argument as to why your moral framework is absolute.
Maybe you could explain why you are a moral realist, and how you know your moral framework and moral conclusions are more than mere opinions. -
2018-12-29 at 2:07 AM UTC
Originally posted by Obbe So people who eat meat should eat meat?
No, broadly speaking people eat meat because they eat meat. But that's not a very useful description of anything. There are many levels of description. At the level of particle physics, there is no description of "people". It is utterly retarded that you do not understand this. There is no interpretation of physics at the granular level that has any vocabulary relevant to people, society, the universe. And that's not necessarily because of the laws of physics at their base layers, but larger organizational structures, for example the topology of the space in which these abstract mathematical operations take place, and it's not clear where that fits in or if it even does fit in clearly with with what we can principally investigate scientifically (since that's just how we model these phenomena).
In terms of the science factuals, we don't even have the principle abstraction layers between chemistry and biology, for example. And who knows the sort of possibility spaces operate between those abstraction layers, just due to interlevel dynamics? For example relativity + QM plays a part in GPS technology, to make a classical scale effect, a human scale effect.
So we make discrete layers of description. We have biology without guy understanding the intermediate abstraction layers every time. How does the angular position. Of the moon affect growth patterns for bacterial moss? Who knows, let's find out. The science of biological organisms in their environment, biology.
I don't know if you have hard autism or some other mental block that makes you completely incapable of changing your mind to anything outside the first and only book you've ever read, but I really wish I could get through it and get you to understand. The whole point of the entire endeavour of naturalistic inquiry is to resolve the world of human existence with an objective explanatory picture of the universe. -
2018-12-29 at 2:26 AM UTC
Originally posted by Obbe I don't think I do misunderstand you, I just don't agree with your assertion that moral facts exist in the same way that the mass of an electron is the mass of an electron.
But you would agree that moral facts, if they exist, are not a mere matter of opinion? You just happen to think there are no true unqualified ought statements, but that itself is a moral fact, your position is that it's not merely your opinion that there are no unqualified ought statements, it's a matter of fact, yes? So we can at least agree on what a moral fact is, even if you're not yet convinced "we ought not eat meat" is a true one.Your moral conclusions might be consistent with the moral framework they emerge from but if a person rejects your moral frame work they are going to reject your moral conclusions, and so far I have not seen you give any argument as to why your moral framework is absolute.
Your physical conclusions might be consistent with the physical framework they emerge from but if a person rejects your physical frame work they are going to reject your physical conclusions.
We can talk about metaethics if you like, about the justifications given for moral frameworks, but first let's make sure we have a mutual understanding of what is meant by terms like "moral obligation" and "moral facts", otherwise there's no point discussing justification of something if we can't even agree on what that thing is. Posts like this:
Originally posted by Obbe Opinions about morality cannot be true, only consistent with the moral framework they emerge from … If I feel something is right or wrong, and you feel the opposite, that doesn't tell us anything about reality, that only tells us about how each of us feel about something.
suggest you're using these kinds of terms differently than I, or any moral realist, would. -
2018-12-29 at 10:29 AM UTCHey Lammy what do you think about moral transactionalism/reciprocality?
For instance some people will argue that if a pig could eat you they would (pigs will eat smaller animals, so do fish, chickens and even cows). Or that being vegan is like expecting a lion not to eat you because you wouldn't eat the lion.
Most cultures have a morality, but very few have a universal morality, where they'll care at all about those outside of their in-group.
Did we discuss fish? Are fish meat? Do moral rules apply to fish? The oceans are like a big soup of fungi, plants and animals all eating each other, how do you start trying to apply moral rules to it? -
2018-12-29 at 10:39 AM UTC
Originally posted by MORALLY SUPERIOR BEING III: The Quest for 911 Truth Hey Lammy what do you think about moral transactionalism/reciprocality?
For instance some people will argue that if a pig could eat you they would (pigs will eat smaller animals, so do fish, chickens and even cows). Or that being vegan is like expecting a lion not to eat you because you wouldn't eat the lion.
It's more of a problem for deontologists, particularly social contract theorists. Utilitarians don't have any particular issue holding different criteria for moral considerability and agency. Things are morally considerable when they can "experience" utility, pain or pleasure to hedonic utilitarians. They have moral agency and responsibility when they have a meaningful choice in the matter. It's not a particularly unintuitive idea, we aren't bothered by a wide range of behavior from young children including violence and theft that would represent a very serious violation for an adult. Why? Because we recognize children don't yet understand the rules of the society they find themselves in. Reciprocity isn't _really_ a hard requirement for moral considerability for almost anyone. -
2018-12-29 at 11:12 AM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny It's more of a problem for deontologists, particularly social contract theorists.
I'm sure someone somewhere has "deontologist" on their business card.Utilitarians don't have any particular issue holding different criteria for moral considerability and agency. Things are morally considerable when they can "experience" utility, pain or pleasure to hedonic utilitarians. They have moral agency and responsibility when they have a meaningful choice in the matter.
What people agree publicly and what they really think are two different things.
Things = individuals? Can a hive of bees experience pain or pleasure? Do individual bees have a meaningful choice? What about religious adherents? Do they have a meaningful choice?It's not a particularly unintuitive idea, we aren't bothered by a wide range of behavior from young children including violence and theft that would represent a very serious violation for an adult. Why? Because we recognize children don't yet understand the rules of the society they find themselves in. Reciprocity isn't _really_ a hard requirement for moral considerability for almost anyone.
Is this why shitlib American parents are always the ones who let their parents go crazy in restaurants? Serious question. The whole "don't use force" school of parenting? "They don't know any better, therefore instead of me correcting them, I'll let them do whatever they want?" -
2018-12-29 at 3:02 PM UTC
Originally posted by MORALLY SUPERIOR BEING III: The Quest for 911 Truth Is this why shitlib American parents are always the ones who let their parents go crazy in restaurants? Serious question. The whole "don't use force" school of parenting? "They don't know any better, therefore instead of me correcting them, I'll let them do whatever they want?"
and this is also how they're being made to accept, embrace and justify to themselves the over representation of niggers in correctional facilities. -
2018-12-29 at 3:08 PM UTC
Originally posted by vindicktive vinny and this is also how they're being made to accept, embrace and justify to themselves the over representation of niggers in correctional facilities.
If you're surrounded by an extremely high level of order, civilisation and rationality your whole life perhaps then anything that upsets that seems like a force of nature you can do nothing to control. -
2018-12-29 at 3:17 PM UTC
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2018-12-29 at 4:10 PM UTC
Originally posted by Lanny But you would agree that moral facts, if they exist, are not a mere matter of opinion? You just happen to think there are no true unqualified ought statements, but that itself is a moral fact, your position is that it's not merely your opinion that there are no unqualified ought statements, it's a matter of fact, yes? So we can at least agree on what a moral fact is, even if you're not yet convinced "we ought not eat meat" is a true one.
Your physical conclusions might be consistent with the physical framework they emerge from but if a person rejects your physical frame work they are going to reject your physical conclusions.
We can talk about metaethics if you like, about the justifications given for moral frameworks, but first let's make sure we have a mutual understanding of what is meant by terms like "moral obligation" and "moral facts", otherwise there's no point discussing justification of something if we can't even agree on what that thing is. Posts like this:
suggest you're using these kinds of terms differently than I, or any moral realist, would.
The reason I may be using the terms differently than you might be that I am not a moral realist and that I do not agree with you that moral facts exist in the same way that the mass of an electron is the mass of an electron.
If a person rejects physical reality, well, they are probably going to have a tough life. If a person rejects your moral framework it probably doesn't matter at all, unless the system is compelling everyone to adhere to that specific moral framework.
Maybe you could explain why you are a moral realist, and how you know your moral framework and moral conclusions are more than mere opinions, and what you mean by terms like moral facts and moral obligations.
Since you are simply asserting that moral facts exist without giving any explanation as to why, we can simply reject your assertion without needing to give any explanation as to why. -
2018-12-29 at 4:15 PM UTC
Originally posted by Loing No, broadly speaking people eat meat because they eat meat. But that's not a very useful description of anything. There are many levels of description. At the level of particle physics, there is no description of "people". It is utterly retarded that you do not understand this. There is no interpretation of physics at the granular level that has any vocabulary relevant to people, society, the universe. And that's not necessarily because of the laws of physics at their base layers, but larger organizational structures, for example the topology of the space in which these abstract mathematical operations take place, and it's not clear where that fits in or if it even does fit in clearly with with what we can principally investigate scientifically (since that's just how we model these phenomena).
In terms of the science factuals, we don't even have the principle abstraction layers between chemistry and biology, for example. And who knows the sort of possibility spaces operate between those abstraction layers, just due to interlevel dynamics? For example relativity + QM plays a part in GPS technology, to make a classical scale effect, a human scale effect.
So we make discrete layers of description. We have biology without guy understanding the intermediate abstraction layers every time. How does the angular position. Of the moon affect growth patterns for bacterial moss? Who knows, let's find out. The science of biological organisms in their environment, biology.
I don't know if you have hard autism or some other mental block that makes you completely incapable of changing your mind to anything outside the first and only book you've ever read, but I really wish I could get through it and get you to understand. The whole point of the entire endeavour of naturalistic inquiry is to resolve the world of human existence with an objective explanatory picture of the universe.
People deliver pizzas because people deliver pizzas. Maybe some of these people want to deliver pizza. Maybe some of these people feel compelled to deliver pizza. There is no reason to believe anyone should deliver pizza. Maybe you believe people "should" deliver pizza and maybe you believe that is a moral fact, but we have no reason to agree with you. -
2018-12-29 at 4:51 PM UTC
Originally posted by Obbe People deliver pizzas because people deliver pizzas. Maybe some of these people want to deliver pizza. Maybe some of these people feel compelled to deliver pizza. There is no reason to believe anyone should deliver pizza. Maybe you believe people "should" deliver pizza and maybe you believe that is a moral fact, but we have no reason to agree with you.
Unfortunately, you have unsuccessfully tried to lie about what I said, which was "should he take the most efficient route?", which not at all involves questioning the very enterprise of delivering pizza.
That's a completely different level of description, that is entertained because we presume to have made the necessary assumptions before that point to get to where we are discussing a delivery route. We have already taken it as given that the customer ordered a pizza, they form an agreement to exchange money for food (BUT IS MONEY REAL?!?!) with the business, they make the food, and now they must consider the path they ought to take to take to the customer's house. I mean, I literally just explained this to you. This is no different than the assumptions we take to get to the abstraction layers that, say, neuroscience operates at. We just observe phenomena.
The "ought" is an observation of which assumption we start with in order to connect our "is"es. And that assumption is also an "is", but but to study that is, you have to make a further set of assumptions of "ought". You're not going to escape this problem.
If you just took the time to read up on Hume with a clear mind, you'd see how amazingly dumb you're being right now.
Moral frameworks simply model the interaction of these assumptions. There's some axioms that have no inherent fact but are seemingly true for us to have certain discussion. -
2018-12-29 at 5:01 PM UTCTo flip it around: in order to do math, we make determinations why something ought not be any other way, all the time. If that's not a strong establishment of ought to you, you probably have the big gay.
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2018-12-29 at 5:16 PM UTC
Originally posted by Loing Unfortunately, you have unsuccessfully tried to lie about what I said, which was "should he take the most efficient route?", which not at all involves questioning the very enterprise of delivering pizza.
That's a completely different level of description, that is entertained because we presume to have made the necessary assumptions before that point to get to where we are discussing a delivery route. We have already taken it as given that the customer ordered a pizza, they form an agreement to exchange money for food (BUT IS MONEY REAL?!?!) with the business, they make the food, and now they must consider the path they ought to take to take to the customer's house. I mean, I literally just explained this to you. This is no different than the assumptions we take to get to the abstraction layers that, say, neuroscience operates at. We just observe phenomena.
The "ought" is an observation of which assumption we start with in order to connect our "is"es. And that assumption is also an "is", but but to study that is, you have to make a further set of assumptions of "ought". You're not going to escape this problem.
If you just took the time to read up on Hume with a clear mind, you'd see how amazingly dumb you're being right now.
Moral frameworks simply model the interaction of these assumptions. There's some axioms that have no inherent fact but are seemingly true for us to have certain discussion.
You appear to agree that there is no reason to believe people should deliver pizza. You are simply saying that if someone has a goal in their mind, some actions will achieve their goal better than other actions, which is not something I have ever disputed. None of this seems to support the idea that moral facts exist beyond your imagination. -
2018-12-29 at 6:55 PM UTC
Originally posted by Obbe You appear to agree that there is no reason to believe people should deliver pizza. You are simply saying that if someone has a goal in their mind, some actions will achieve their goal better than other actions, which is not something I have ever disputed. None of this seems to support the idea that moral facts exist beyond your imagination.
There is no objective reason to deliver pizza, but on the basis of the fact that we do deliver pizza, we can come to factual conclusions on all sorts of aspects of reality.
Our desires are literally empirical data about the world, and we can model them in terms of how they interact. You can do this however you want. Categorical imperative, social contract, game theory... But if you can accept the data and the premises, you cannot reject the conclusions. To not grasp this is just a basic failure of understanding. It's literally no different than any hard science endeavour either, at its most basic level. That's how we can see an 8% neutron excess on a graph and make a strong claim about finding a fundamental particle of the universe.
And you can build from axioms that would apply to any normal, able bodied, mentally sound agent, from their perspective.
For example, the basic right to life. If someone wants to keep doing things at all, they want to stay alive. We can take that as an axiom, and draw conclusions based on that in a wheelchair variety of different models.
No there's no inherent meaning to it. That is not a thing. But it has meaning to us, the same way anything else does. -
2018-12-29 at 7:03 PM UTCBill Krozby delivers pizzas because he have to, not because he wants to,
he ought to deliver pizza because the situation surrounding his life made it so. -
2018-12-29 at 11:55 PM UTC
Originally posted by MORALLY SUPERIOR BEING III: The Quest for 911 Truth Things = individuals? Can a hive of bees experience pain or pleasure? Do individual bees have a meaningful choice? What about religious adherents? Do they have a meaningful choice?
These are questions that need to be addressed empirically, I'm not committed to an answer one way or another and am willing to change my position based on new evidence. As best I can tell bee hives probably don't have hedonic faculties, although they do have some very interesting emergent behaviors so I wouldn't rule it out entirely. Bees don't seem to really possess the required faculties to ask questions like "is it morally permissible to sting such and such". I think most humans have the intellectual capacity to engage in moral reasoning, and most do at least sometimes, although I suppose I can imagine people so strongly conditioned by a program of religious indoctrination that they can at least partially be excused for their conduct that follows from that.Is this why shitlib American parents are always the ones who let their parents go crazy in restaurants? Serious question. The whole "don't use force" school of parenting? "They don't know any better, therefore instead of me correcting them, I'll let them do whatever they want?"
No. Firstly this isn't really a "shitlib" phenomenon. Second you can think it's not OK to strike your child without letting them wreak havoc in restaurants, it turns out there's more ways to make a child behave in socially acceptable ways than inflicting physical pain on them. Lastly, and this is the only point that's actually relevant to the topic, it's wholly possible to say something isn't at fault but still take "punitive" action against it. We don't ascribe moral agency to earthquakes, but we still construct buildings to withstand them. Likewise I don't think a child has full moral agency, but that doesn't mean I don't think they should be above punishment or that we shouldn't do what we can to mitigate their undesirable behavior. They're just not morally accountable for their actions.
Originally posted by Obbe The reason I may be using the terms differently than you might be that I am not a moral realist and that I do not agree with you that moral facts exist in the same way that the mass of an electron is the mass of an electron.
You don't have to be a moral realist to understand what is meant by the term "moral obligation" in the title of this thread. -
2018-12-30 at 12:55 AM UTC
